Esimerkiksi kirjoitus hiilivuodosta ja siitä miten sitä voidaan hoitaa on hyvä:
In theory, there is a possible legitimate role for border adjustments in facilitating a multilateral regime such as the Kyoto Protocol. One might think of penalties on carbon-intensive imports:
1. as sanctions to apply pressure on non-participants,
2. as a calibrated “countervailing duty” to equalize a distortion that will otherwise see carbon-intensive activities migrate to less-regulated countries (a phenomenon known as leakage) or
3. as political reassurance to domestic firms worried about their international
If designed properly, they need not necessarily be inconsistent with the WTO (World Trade Organization). There are precedents, most importantly (and most ironically) the famous/infamous shrimp/turtle case.
But U.S. politicians are unlikely to do it properly. They may be unaware that the US is more likely to end up as the target of such tariffs than as the enactor – to end up as the defendant, rather than as the prosecutor. The European Union is way ahead of us in cutting back GHG emissions under the Kyoto protocol, and its EC Directive earlier this year had similar language calling for penalties aimed at shirking competitors. That’s us.
Jotenkin näin kotimaisesti lapsenusko että meidän teollisuus on energiatehokkainta ja ne muut tuottavat päästöjä tuntuu tutulta.